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[536] 
Presidential Impunity and the Mueller Report: 
How the Department of Justice’s Failure to 
Subject the Special Counsel Regulations to 
Notice and Comment Undermined the Rule of 
Law 
 




 Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Special Counsel, Robert S. Mueller, 
III’s two-volume, 448-page Report on the Investigation into Russian Inter-
ference in the 2016 Presidential Election (“the Report”), did an outstanding 
job in evidencing that President Trump’s actions in office satisfied the fed-
eral obstruction of justice standards.  However, due to Mueller’s limited brief 
and his concern for maintaining the proper separation of powers, the Report, 
submitted confidentially to former Attorney General Barr as required by De-
partment of Justice Regulations, abjured a determination as to Presidential 
criminality.  This regulatory confidentiality requirement in conjunction with 
the requirement that Barr disclose an unverifiable Report summary to Con-
gress, entitled the former Attorney General to mischaracterize the then-con-
fidential report as an effective exoneration of the President, when the full 
Report actually reads like a depressing Mafia boss indictment.  By the time 
Barr released the Report almost a full month later, the damage was done.  
The former President and his supporters by then had succeeded in manipu-
lating the political culture to accept Barr’s dishonest mischaracterization of 
the Report and stymie its use to commence either an impeachment proceed-
ing or force the President to put a stop to Russian election interference.   
Barr’s success in marginalizing the Report tragically facilitated 
Presidential impunity by encouraging the President’s worst instincts as man-
ifested by his abuse of power in the Ukraine matter and his Administration’s 
dishonest, bungling and divisive response to both the COVID-19 pandemic 
 
 1. Professor of Law, LMU Duncan School of Law.  Professor Faizer would like to thank his 
wife, Melanie Faizer, for her loving support throughout.  He would also like to thank the members 
of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for preparing this piece for publication. 
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and the civil rights protests that followed George Floyd’s killing.  Indeed, 
although the President was subsequently impeached and tried by the full U.S. 
Senate twice for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress with respect to 
U.S. relations with the Government of Ukraine and for inciting an insurrec-
tion by his supporters to prevent Congress from certifying the 2020 Presi-
dential election results in favor of his opponent, current President Joseph 
Biden, the ostensible “Russia Hoax” and “witch hunt” against the President 
was cited by the President and his supporters to delegitimize the impeach-
ment proceedings and facilitate the President’s partisan acquittals by the 
Senate. 
 Although presidential impunity has been facilitated by political po-
larization and partisan media, it is also, in this instance, attributable to infir-
mities in the Department of Justice Special Counsel regulations (“Special 
Counsel Regulations”) that would have been ferreted out had they been 
timely submitted for notice and comment feedback when first implemented 
by former Attorney General Reno in 1999.  This is because the Special Coun-
sel Regulations, as written, never contemplated an unprincipled and partisan-
inclined Attorney General who would undermine the Report to further Pres-
idential impunity.  
I recommend submitting the Special Counsel Regulations for notice 
and comment review under The Administrative Procedure Act Section 553 
to solicit feedback from civil society as to how they can be improved con-
sistent with the President’s powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.  
At a minimum, I would expect that the received public comment will recom-
mend future Attorneys General be disallowed from disclosing synopses or 
summaries of Special Counsel reports without simultaneously disclosing the 
entire redacted document.  If this requirement had been in place at the time 
when the Report was first submitted to Barr, the political culture would have 
reacted far more forcefully against presidential abuse of power and obstruc-
tion of justice.  Most likely, former President Trump would either have been 
removed from office or chastened by a near conviction in the Senate after 
impeachment in the House.  Certainly, the country would not be facing the 
current struggle of maintaining national cohesion after an unprecedented sec-
ond impeachment of a president, after former President Trump, egregiously 
and systematically abused his power to undermine public confidence in the 
2020 presidential election, and, after losing the election to President Biden, 
both refused to concede the election, and incited a mob of his supporters to 
invade the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, which temporarily prevented 
Congress from certifying the results of the 2020 presidential election. 
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 In June 2020, the highly regarded New York Times columnist and 
public intellectual David Brooks wrote that America was facing five simul-
taneous crises: 1) the losing fight against the Covid-19 pandemic; 2) the rapid 
opinion shift surrounding race relations and racial inequality; 3) major polit-
ical realignment brought about by the public’s apparent rejection of Presi-
dent Trump’s Republican Party; 4) the quasi-religion of Social Justice, which 
is seeking to control the nation’s cultural institutions; and 5) an economic 
depression.2  Although all five of these epic crises are attributable to broad 
social forces, including the spread of communicable disease in the era of 
globalization, it cannot be disputed that they were worsened by former Pres-
ident Trump’s reflexive authoritarianism, contempt for the rule of law and 
overall unfitness for office. Needless to say, these factors help explain why 
Trump narrowly lost the 2020 presidential election to his opponent, Joe 
Biden, notwithstanding his parlous disregard for the country’s democratic 
norms and the rule of law.  Indeed, the problems related to the five simulta-
neous crises are so pronounced that it is easy to forget that in early 2020, 
President Trump looked like a formidable candidate for reelection after he 
was first acquitted by the Senate on impeachment charges for abuse of power 
and obstruction of Congress based on the President’s improper and politi-
cally-motivated threat to withhold Congressionally appropriated military as-
sistance from Ukraine.3  The first Senate acquittal was nominally unrelated 
to the Report,4 which was delivered to former United States Attorney Gen-
eral William Barr on March 22, 2019, and demonstrated that the Russian 
Federation interfered in the 2016 Presidential Election in favor of then-can-
didate Trump and detailed numerous instances where former President 
Trump sought to obstruct and hinder the Special Counsel’s investigation.5  
The Report now seems, to paraphrase the British aphorism, like ancient his-
tory.  It should not.  Rather, due to Barr’s mischaracterization of the Report’s 
key findings and conclusions, it failed to elicit the appropriate political re-
sponse, either from Congress or the broader political culture, which embold-
ened former President Trump to further abuse his powers and enabled Trump 
 
 2. David Brooks, America is Facing 5 Epic Crises All at Once, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/opinion/us-coronavirus-protests.html. 
 3. Peter Baker, Impeachment Trial Updates: Senate Acquits Trump, Ending Historic Trial, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/impeachment-
vote.html. 
 4. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION 
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, Volumes 1 and 2 (2019), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/storage/report.pdf [hereinafter THE REPORT].  
 5. Id. 
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and his partisans to mischaracterize both the Special Counsel’s investigation 
into the extent of  Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and 
the facts surrounding the two subsequent impeachment proceedings brought 
against him as partisan-driven “witch hunts.”  It also furthered the former 
President’s reflexive authoritarianism to undermine effective preparedness 
and response to what Brooks describes as the five simultaneous crises.  In 
short, the Report’s ultimate failure to hold the former President accountable 
for his criminal actions not only undermined the rule of law but furthered the 
Trump’s sense of impunity, which, when conjoined with his reflexive au-
thoritarianism, worsened the current crises facing American government and 
society.  
Why did the Report fall as flat as it did when the evidence of presi-
dential criminality was so strong?  One answer is that the Report’s failure to 
elicit the level of indignation commensurate with the President’s crimes is 
partly attributable to the political polarization and ratings-driven partisan 
media entities that reflexively defend the former President.  However, pres-
idential impunity has, in this instance, also been furthered by infirmities in 
the DOJ Special Counsel Regulations (“Special Counsel Regulations”) that 
effectively enabled Barr to gutter the Report.6  This is because, per the Spe-
cial Counsel Regulations, the Report had to be submitted confidentially to 
Barr, who was entitled to publicly discuss the Report and submit an unveri-
fiable Report synopsis to Congress and the public without any obligation to 
publicly disclose the full Report.7  It also denied Mueller or members of his 
team the ability to publicly dispute the former Attorney General’s public 
mischaracterizations of the Report.8  In a March 24, 2019 letter to the lead-
ership of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees (“March 24 Letter”), 
Barr’s mischaracterized the Report as failing to find evidence of presidential 
criminality.9  This enabled the Trump and his supporters, in the month-long 
timeframe between the Report’s submission to Barr and its eventual disclo-
sure to the public, to claim that the Report exonerated Trump and his White 
House from allegations of criminal wrongdoing related to the Russia 
 
 6. 28 C.F.R. § 600.8 (1999) provides that the Special Counsel’s report is to be confidentially 
provided to the Attorney General without any limitation as to how the Attorney General can use or 
characterize such report. 
 7. 28 C.F.R. § 600.9 (1999). 
 8. 28 C.F.R. § 600.8. Section C entitled Attorney General Barr to submit an unrebutted and 
publicly available four-page summary of the Report to the Chair and Ranking Members of the 
House and Senate Judiciary Committees, that definitively mischaracterized the Report’s conclu-
sions in President Trump’s favor. 
 9. Letter from William Barr to Lindsey Graham, Jerrold Nadler, Dianne Feinstein and Doug 
Collins (Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1153021/download [hereinafter 
March 24 Letter]. 
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Investigation.  This was followed by a subsequent letter, dated April 18, 
2019, which anticipated the next day’s release of the fully redacted Report 
by ostensibly summarizing the Report’s the conclusions in a manner con-
sistent with the March 24 Letter.10 
When Barr finally released the fully redacted Report on April 19, 
2019, the damage was done.  Because neither Mueller nor members of his 
team could challenge Barr’s characterization of the Report in the interim, 
Barr’s written mischaracterizations, in conjunction with public statements he 
made regarding the Report’s conclusions, took hold of the political culture 
and facilitated a supposition that former President Trump’s misdeeds, alt-
hough depressingly laid out in the Report, neither constituted abuse of 
power, nor merited an impeachment inquiry by the House of Representa-
tives.  
 
I. Informal Notice and Comment Rulemaking under Administrative 
Law 
 
 The Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) most important “in-
novation was establishing a procedure for rulemaking,” which typically does 
not require a hearing on the record and instead is subject to the notice and 
comment procedure set out in Title Five of the Unites States Federal Code 
Section 553.11  This consists of: 
 
1. General notice of a proposed rulemaking in the Federal 
Register, specifying the time and place of the rulemak-
ing proceedings, the legal authority relied on for their 
issuance, and the content or subject matter of the pro-
posed rule; 
2. Opportunity for interested persons to submit written 
comments on the proposed rule, and, at the agency’s 
option, opportunity for oral presentations; 
3. Agency consideration of the comments; 
4. Issuance, when the final rule is promulgated, of a con-
cise statement of its basis and purpose; 
5. Publication of the final rule in the Federal Register; 
 
 10. Letter from William Barr to Lindsey Graham, Jerrold Nadler, Dianne Feinstein and Doug 
Collins (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/page/file/1167086/download [herein-
after April 18 Letter]. 
 11. STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY, 519 (7th 
ed. 2011). 
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6. In the case of substantive rules that impose new re-
quirements, delay of the rule’s effective date for at least 
thirty days after publication.12 
The purpose of the procedure is to enlighten decisionmakers by ex-
posing them to the viewpoints of interested persons and allow those persons 
to have a say in the final rules.13  It, furthermore, improves the quality of 
rulemaking by helping agencies anticipate what former Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld has called the “known unknowns” and “unknown un-
knowns” to improve upon the previously issued tentative rules.14  Indeed, in 
recent years, notice-and-comment rulemaking has been transformed, espe-
cially as regards controversial proposals, into “a rather elaborate paper hear-
ing procedure that generates a full documentary record and an elaborate 
agency option that attempts to justify  the agency rule and respond to evi-
dentiary, analytical, and policy criticisms of the rule and its supporting ma-
terial.”15  United States v. Nova Scotia Products Corp16 is paradigmatic.  
Nova Scotia involved the Food and Drug Administration’s conduct of 553 
notice-and-comment rulemaking for purposes of issuing safety regulations 
for the smoking of fish to safeguard against botulism poisoning.17  The FDA 
sued to enjoin Nova Scotia Food Products Corp. and its officers from pro-
cessing hot-smoked whitefish in violation of the regulations.18  After the dis-
trict court granted the injunction, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, concluding that the FDA’s rule promulgation was based on 
inadequate procedures because FDA failed to disclose the scientific data and 
the methodology upon which it relied and because “it failed utterly to address 
itself to the question of commercial feasibility,” i.e. it never addressed the 
interposed comment that applying the proposed regulations to whitefish 
would destroy the commercial product.19  In particular, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the failure to notify interested persons “of the scientific re-
search upon which the agency was relying actually prevented the presenta-
tion of relevant comment, means the agency failed to consider all the relevant 
factors” because to “suppress meaningful comment by failure to disclose the 
 
 12. Id.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 (West 2016). 
 13. BREYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 519. 
 14. Id. at 519.  Former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was famously quoted as saying “[a]s we 
know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know.  We also know there are known 
unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.  But there are also un-
known unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.” 
 15. Id. at 552. 
 16. 568 F.2d 240 (2nd Cir. 1977). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  
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basic data relied  upon is akin to rejecting comment altogether” and leads to 
arbitrary decision-making.20  Similarly, in Chamber of Commerce v. SEC,21 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals set aside a Securities and Ex-
change Commission rule because the agency never publicly disclosed, dur-
ing notice-and-comment, that it had relied on extra-record studies that were 
the essential foundation for the SEC’s basic assumptions in making its anal-
ysis.22   
The purpose behind notice-and-comment is to aid the agency in ar-
riving at and enlightened policy choice. Department of Homeland Security 
v. Regents of the University of California,23 points to the importance of ad-
ministrative proceduralism and the effectuation of “hard look” review to in-
sulate the professional civil service from illegitimate political pressure. In 
DHS, the Court invalidated the Trump Administration’s rescission of the 
Obama Administration-implemented Deferred Action for Childhood Arri-
vals (“DACA”) program on the grounds it failed to satisfy “hard look” re-
view, notwithstanding a change in Presidential Administration, because 1) 
the agency’s purported reasons for the rescission consisted primarily of “post 
hoc” rationalizations that undermine agency accountability; 2) DHS treated 
the former Attorney General Sessions’ illegality conclusion regarding 
DACA’s provision of lawful presence benefits to unauthorized migrants as 
sufficient to rescind both benefits and forbearance of deportation, without 
explaining why it failed to consider only forbearance as an alternative policy; 
and 3) DHS arbitrarily and capriciously failed to consider legitimate reliance 
interests on the original DACA Memorandum by failing to weigh them 
against competing policy concerns.24  
 There are, however, broad exceptions to APA mandated notice-and-
comment rulemaking.  Under Section 553(a), military and foreign affairs 
functions and rules relating to “agency management or personnel or to public 
property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts” are exempted from the sec-
tion’s requirements.25  Moreover, the requirements of notice in the Federal 
Register and opportunity for comment do not apply “to interpretive rules, 
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice,” or when the agency for “good cause” finds the notice and comment 
procedure is “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 22. Chamber of Commerce, 443 F.3d 890. 
 23. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1891 
(2020). 
 24. Id. 
 25. BREYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 520.  
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interest.”26  Recognizing that time and resources can be saved in bypassing 
notice and comment, doing so precludes an agency from improving upon the 
tentative rules through public comment by exposing the agency to, perhaps, 
unanticipated counterfactuals and contingencies.27  This is tragically what 
happened with the Special Counsel Regulations when former Attorney Gen-
eral Reno bypassed notice-and-comment and instead issued them as direct 
final rules in 1999.28  
 
II. The DOJ Special Counsel Regulations 
 
The Special Counsel Regulations were issued as direct final rules, 
exempt from the APA’s typical notice and comment requirements, when 
they were promulgated in 1999.29  Four reasons were given for the exemp-
tions:  
 
First, ‘this [r]ule relates to agency management or person-
nel, and is therefore exempt from the usual requirements of 
prior notice and comment and a 30-day delay in the effective 
date.’  Second, ‘this rule would be exempted from the re-
quirements of notice and comment as a rule of agency or-
ganization, procedure, practice.’  Third, ‘the effective date 
of the rule need not be delayed for 30 days after publication 
because the rule is not a ‘substantive rule.’’  The fourth rea-
son is potentially the most important . . . ‘because the provi-
sions of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 
1994 expire on June 30, 1999, the Attorney General has 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Professor Sidney Shapiro has estimated that the comment period only takes a minimum 
of three months and there is a typical four to eight-year timeframe to implement important rules 
using notice and comment.  See WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND 
PRACTICE, 137 (5th ed. 2014). 
 28. The DOJ issued the Special Counsel Regulations as direct final rules based on section 553 
(b)(3)(A) and (b)(3)(B), which provides that notice and comment can be avoided when deemed 
“impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest” by the agency.  28 C.F.R. § 600.7.  
See also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (finding that the APA re-
quires that prior to implementation of a final rule that has force of law, the agency must publish a 
notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register under Section 553 (b) that gives interested 
parties an opportunity to submit data, views or arguments regarding the proposed rule that must be 
considered and given a “hard look” by the agency prior to issuing final rules that have the force of 
law.)    
 29.  See Josh Blackman, Can the Special Counsel Regulations Be Unilaterally Revoked?, 
LAWFARE (July 5, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-special-counsel-regulations-be-unilat-
erally-revoked. 
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determined that it is imperative to have these rules govern-
ing the appointment and service of a Special Counsel in 
place as soon as possible.’”30  
 
Accordingly, even if the rule were not exempt from the usual requirements 
of prior notice and comment and a thirty-day delay in the effective date, there 
would be “good cause” for issuing this rule without prior notice and com-
ment and without a thirty-day delay in the effective date.31  
The Special Counsel Regulations allow the Attorney General to ap-
point a Special Counsel “where he or she determines that criminal investiga-
tion of a person or matter is warranted, that investigation or prosecution of 
that person by the U.S. Attorney’s Office or litigating division of the Depart-
ment of Justice would present a conflict of interest for the Department or 
other extraordinary circumstances”32 and that “it would be in the public in-
terest to appoint an outside Special Counsel to assume responsibility for the 
matter.”33  The Special Counsel is to be cloaked with all the powers of “any 
United States Attorney”34  and the Special Counsel can be disciplined or re-
moved from office “only by personal action by the Attorney General,” who 
may remove a Special Counsel for “misconduct, dereliction of duty, inca-
pacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including violation of 
Departmental policies.”35  The Special Counsel Regulations further provide 
that the Special Counsel’s final report is to be submitted confidentially to the 
Attorney General, explaining the final prosecution or declination decision,36 
and the Attorney General has sole discretion to determine whether the final 
report is to be publicly released.37  The regulation then provides that the At-
torney General shall issue a notification and report to the Chairman and 
Ranking Members of the Judiciary Committees of each house of congress, 
upon appointing a Special Counsel, upon removing a Special Counsel, and, 
most importantly for purposes of this article, upon conclusion of the Special 
Counsel’s investigation.38  Moreover, the regulations leave to the Attorney 
General the power to determine whether to release to Congress or the public 
all or parts of a Special Counsel’s fiscal, annual or final reports.39  
 
 30. See id. 
 31. See Blackman, supra note 29. 
 32. 28 C.F.R. § 600.1. 
 33. Id. 
 34. 28 C.F.R. § 600.6. 
 35. 28 C.F.R. § 600.7 (d). 
 36. 28 C.F.R. § 600.8. 
 37. 28 C.F.R § 600.9. 
 38. Id.  
 39. 28 C.F.R. § 600.9 (c). 
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 The Special Counsel Regulations have proven ineffective at protect-
ing against Executive Branch corruption in the Trump Administration.  This 
is for several reasons.  First, they never anticipated the growth of profit-
driven partisan media to protect the Administration from accountability.  
This is attributable to technology and broader cultural phenomena that are 
beyond this paper’s scope.  Second, the Special Counsel Regulations never 
anticipated a partisan Attorney General publicly mischaracterizing a Special 
Counsel report as has been the case with Attorney General Barr and the Re-
port.  A remedy is needed.  My recommendation, in view of these infirmities 
and abuses, is to subject the Special Counsel Regulations to a new round of 
notice and comment feedback under Section 553, anticipating expert feed-
back on means of assuring executive branch accountability in a polarized 
political environment.40   
This is because the APA requires agencies to incorporate feedback 
received as to the tentative rules from the public, regulated entities, legal 
experts and civil society, to assist it in arriving at better regulations to effec-
tuate the goals behind the rulemaking.  In other words, it helps the agency 
arrive at better rules by enabling it to incorporate concerns that were not ad-
dressed in the tentative rulemaking.41  Indeed, bypassing notice and comment 
as the DOJ did when promulgating the Special Counsel Regulations, may 
seem logical from an expediency perspective, but is not the best way to 
evolve public law and policy.42  Ideally, the comments received would edu-
cate the DOJ as to means of improving Special Counsel Regulations in view 
of recent history consistent with separation of powers concerns.  They would 
most likely recommend amended rules that, at the very least, preclude the 
Attorney General from issuing any report summary to Congress without con-
temporaneously releasing a full report to both Congress and the public.43  
 
 40. 5 U.S.C. § 553.   
 41. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985) (where the 
court remanded to the agency to resubmit tentative rules when the initial tentative rules had ade-
quately advised the flavored milk industry that its interests could be affected by tentative rules 
designed to improve nutrition in the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and 
Children; see also Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 682 F.3d 87 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (con-
cluding that interim final rules promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) had 
to be vacated for failure to subject the rulemaking to notice and comment because EPA could not 
show that use of notice and comment was contrary to the public interest); but see U.S. v. Dean, 604 
F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the Attorney General’s invocation of a good cause 
exception to the usual notice and comment requirement for implementation of retroactive rules 
applicable to all sex offenders convicted prior to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act, was merited to withstand judicial review). 
 42. U.S. v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 929–31 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 43. After making appropriate redactions to protect existing court proceedings and future pros-
ecutions. 
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Although this change would not be a panacea in that ideologically driven 
media will still seek to distort any report conclusions, it will, at least, protect 
a Special Counsel Report’s integrity from a dispositive mischaracterization 
by a partisan Attorney General keen on protecting the president at whose 
pleasure he serves.  Although it might seem counterintuitive for an Admin-
istration to, in effect, weaken its executive power over criminal investiga-
tions by enacting such a regulatory amendment via notice and comment, it 
would, over time, enhance the power and prestige of the presidency by en-
couraging trust in government in a country where cynicism and misanthropy 
undermines national cohesion.44  After all, former President Trump, while 
apparently immune from accountability for presidential abuse of power, re-
mained a very weak president during his term of office, notwithstanding full 
employment prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and, a relatively robust do-
mestic economy during his presidential term of office.45  If my proposal were 
to have been implemented in the almost eighteen years between the Special 
Counsel Regulations’ initial implementation and the appointment of Special 
Counsel Mueller, the end result might have been a more effective response 
to both Russian election interference and presidential abuse of power and 
obstruction of justice.  It might also have fortuitously strengthened the hand 
of republican senators such as Mitt Romney who, as a matter of principal, 
object to presidential abuse of power.46  At the very least, a properly chas-
tened President Trump might never have dared abuse his power to coerce 
Ukraine’s President into investigating a political rival for partisan advantage, 
nor feel emboldened to undermine public confidence in both the 2020 elec-
tion and the 2020 presidential election result.  I now turn to the subject of 
how the U.S. Constitution protects against Presidential impunity. 
 
III. Holding a President to Account: The President’s Powers 
under Article II and the Congress’s Sole Remedy of Impeachment and 
Conviction 
 
 The U.S. Constitution provides that “the executive Power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States”47 who “shall take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed…”48  Because presidents are in charge of the 
 
 44. See Janan Ganesh, Public Cynicism is Destroying American Politics, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/cf8d0622-f56c-11e9-b018-3ef8794b17c6. 
 45. James Carville, Hey Democrats, It’s the Winning, Stupid!, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 7, 
2020), https://www.ft.com/content/aa0677e0-48fe-11ea-aee2-9ddbdc86190d. 
 46. See Anne Applebaum, History Will Judge the Complicit, THE ATLANTIC, (July/Aug. 
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/07/trumps-collaborators/612250/. 
 47. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. 
 48. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.  See also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) and Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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Executive Branch, which, in turn, is responsible for prosecuting all federal 
crimes, the problem of presidential or Executive Branch corruption becomes 
manifest. Thankfully, the U.S. has been spared an excess of presidential or 
Executive Branch corruption such that the matter of investigating presiden-
tial corruption has not been paradigmatic.49  
 One obvious remedy for presidential corruption, when it has arisen, 
is impeachment by the House of Representatives followed by conviction by 
the U.S. Senate after a trial presided over by the Chief Justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.50  There has been a paucity of Presidential impeachments 
with only three Presidents, including President Trump, being impeached by 
the full House of Representatives and none being convicted after a full trial 
before the U.S. Senate.51  This small number of successful impeachments is 
possibly explained by an enlightened awareness by legislators, over time, 
that impeaching a sitting president can problematically undermine national 
cohesion.52  It is also possible that our Framers, in requiring a two-thirds 
supermajority to convict in the U.S. Senate, inadvertently set the threshold 
for presidential conviction and removal too high, especially in a polarized 
political environment.53  
Impeachment has been mischaracterized as requiring presidential 
criminality in office when the Framers saw it as a remedy to the broader 
problem of presidential unfitness.54  Moreover, President Trump and previ-
ous presidents threatened with impeachment improperly claimed it will re-
verse an election outcome when, as a result of the Twelfth Amendment, the 
duly elected Vice-President, in the case of President Trump, Mike Pence, 
would have assumed office should the President have been convicted by the 
Senate.55  
 
 49. I say this recognizing that there are undoubtedly many examples of corruption that have 
not been disclosed and have therefore been kept secret.  My point is merely that the United States 
has had lower levels of Executive Branch corruption than other major countries. 
 50. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 5, art. I, § 3 cl. 6 and 7 and art. II, § 4. 
 51. Both Presidents Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton were impeached and acquitted by the 
U.S. Senate and President Nixon resigned from office before the full House of Representatives 
could vote on the House Judiciary Committee’s Articles of Impeachment. 
 52. See Ronald Dworkin, A Kind of Coup, New York Review of Books (July 14, 1999); see 
also Cass. R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 Penn. L. Rev. 279 (1998). 
 53. See GENE HEALY, INDISPENSABLE REMEDY, THE BROAD SCOPE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION’S IMPEACHMENT POWER (Cato Institute 2018), https://www.cato.org/white-pa-
per/indispensable-remedy-broad-scope-constitutions-impeachment-power (arguing that the Fram-
ers settled on the two-thirds conviction requirement at the very end of discussions on the matter 
and most likely did not anticipate that it was setting too high a threshold for Presidential removal). 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  The Twelfth Amendment, which was enacted and ratified to remedy problems that 
arose after the 1800 Presidential Election, provides that the Electors are to vote for President and 
Vice-President separately such that the successor to a president who is assassinated, dies in office, 
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Because a president is in charge of the Executive Department with 
sole responsibility to take care that the laws be “faithfully executed,” such 
that his nominated Attorney General is responsible for the Justice Depart-
ment’s prosecution and declination decisions, investigation of presidential 
criminality becomes problematic.56  This unitary approach to executive 
branch power explains the textual legality of the “Saturday Night Massacre,” 
when President Nixon, seeking to avoid disclosure of the Watergate tapes to 
the then Watergate Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox, accepted the resigna-
tion of his Attorney General, Elliott Richardson, when Richardson refused 
to fire Cox, and then fired Richardson’s deputy, William Ruckleshaus, after 
Ruckleshaus also refused to fire Cox.57  What is often forgotten about this 
episode is that when Nixon nominated Richardson to be his Attorney General 
in the midst of the Watergate imbroglio, Richardson promised Democrats on 
the Senate Judiciary to select and protect a special prosecutor as a condition 
of confirmation.58  According to Blackmun, Richardson did not resign be-
cause he thought discharging Cox would be illegal, notwithstanding the reg-
ulations that limited grounds for his removal to “extraordinary improprie-
ties.”59  Rather, as evidenced by a letter Richardson contemporaneously 
wrote to President Nixon, he felt obliged to resign rather than fire Cox based 
on the personal commitment he made to the Senate Judiciary Committee to 
not interfere with the Special Prosecutor’s Counsel’s independence.60  This 
same commitment to the Senate Judiciary Committee explains why Ruck-
leshaus also refused to fire Cox.61   
 
resigns from office or is, perhaps in the future, convicted in the Senate, will take office consistent 
with the prior general election’s result.   
 56. HEALY, supra note 53.  Because the Attorney General is a cabinet member removable at 
the President’s will, Justice Department Special Prosecutors cannot be provided constitutional pro-
tection when investigating alleged Executive Branch malfeasance.  Id. 
 57. Cox, who was appointed by Richardson in conjunction with 38 C.F.R. 14688-01, which 
established the Watergate Prosecution Force, provided that “[t]he Special Prosecutor will not be 
removed from his duties except for extraordinary improprieties on his part.”  Cox was eventually 
fired by then Solicitor General Robert Bork after both Richardson and Ruckleshaus resigned their 
office as Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General, respectively. 
 58. Josh Blackmun, Could Trump Remove Special Counsel Mueller? Lessons from Wa-
tergate, LAWFARE (May 23, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/could-trump-remove-special-
counsel-robert-mueller-lessons-watergate. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  According to a Washington Post article cited by Blackman, Ruckleshaus’s resignation 
was refused, and he was fired by President Nixon for his failure to fire Cox.  See Carroll Kipatrick, 
Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardso Ruckleshaus Quit, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 1973), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/102173-2.html.  
The Post article posits that Nixon allowed Richardson to resign because he accepted Richardson’s 
promise to the Senate as a valid reason for resignation but did not feel the same way about Ruck-
leshaus.  
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Solicitor General Bork eventually carried out President Nixon’s or-
der to fire Cox based on his understanding that the regulations in place can-
not prevent a president from removing a lower-level executive officer, espe-
cially one who sought to publicly defy the President’s directive.62  Bork 
testified during his confirmation hearings as President Reagan’s nominee to 
be an associate Supreme Court Justice, that Richardson actually told him to 
fire Cox because Bork was in a different moral position, never having given 
Cox a Special Prosecutor’s charter and never having promised the Senate 
that he would ensure the Special Prosecutor’s independence.63  Although, in 
Nader v. Bork, Judge Gesell concluded that Cox’s firing was illegal because 
it contravened the Justice Department regulation that corresponded with his 
appointment, this decision was subsequently vacated by the D.C. Circuit 
Court on October 22, 1975, well after the Watergate tapes were released, 
President Nixon resigned the Presidency, and his successor, President Ford, 
issued him a prospective pardon for all acts he committed as President.64  
The legality of a presidential order to fire a lower-level Executive 
Branch official notwithstanding regulations stating otherwise has not been 
resolved.  The orthodox view is that such a directive would be within a pres-
ident’s authority, e.g. Bork felt obliged to fire Cox at Nixon’s behest because 
control of the Justice Department is an inherent executive power under Arti-
cle II.  Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson,65 wherein he character-
izes both the appointment and removal provisions of the Independent Coun-
sel under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 as an unconstitutional 
usurpation of the president’s powers under Article II, has succeeded in rele-
gating Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Morrison to the ranks 
of the Court’s jurisprudential anti-canon.  In short, congressional and regu-
latory measures designed to protect an Independent or Special Counsel from 
removal by their superiors are, most likely, violative of Article II’s Take Care 
Clause.66   
As such, DOJ investigations into Executive Branch lawlessness can 
be scuppered without contemporaneous criminal consequence by a president 
willing to pay the political price as President Nixon did when he ordered 
Cox’s firing, and as President Trump was prepared to do when he, on several 
occasions, sought to have Special Counsel Mueller removed or his authority 
curtailed.  Compounding the problem of impunity, an authoritative 1973 
 
 62. Blackmun, supra note 58.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  The Watergate “smoking gun” tape was released on August 5, 1974, Nixon resigned 
from office on August 9, 1974 and President Ford pardoned Nixon on September 8, 1974. 
 65. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 66. Id. 
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Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) opinion, adopted by Special Counsel 
Mueller, concludes that a sitting President cannot be criminally prosecuted 
while in office.67  This is because such a prosecution would violate the con-
stitutional structure—in other words, a president, who is responsible for pub-
lic prosecutions, cannot be a criminal defendant consistent with his Article 
II obligations.68  This hornbook understanding of U.S. Constitutional juris-
prudence means that the exclusive remedy against a lawless chief executive 
is either impeachment and removal from office based on a Senate trial con-
viction or a delayed prosecution that would commence once the president’s 
term of office expires.69  Furthermore, because the constitution affords a sit-
ting president the ability to use Article II’s pardon power  to pardon subor-
dinates from future federal criminal liability, the sole remedy against a law-
less president is congressional impeachment and conviction.70  This, in turn, 
is problematic because congressional subpoenas are increasingly disregarded 
by the White House on executive privilege grounds,71 and the sole means of 
effectively investigating executive branch corruption is via the appointment 
of a special counsel who can constitutionally be removed from office by the 
Attorney General.  
 
IV. The Lack of Constitutional Remedies to Presidential Lawlessness 
and the Special Counsel Regulations 
 
The Watergate-era evidenced the need to remedy Presidential law-
lessness, especially when the House Judiciary and Senate Watergate Com-
mittees’ hearings into the matter were effectively marginalized as improperly 
partisan until the very end.72  No impeached president has been convicted by 
the Senate and, in the case of President Trump, the Senate went so far as to 
reject the calling of any witnesses prior to acquittal.73  As we have seen, the 
 
 67. A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C 
222 (2000). 
 68. Id.  
 69. See THE REPORT, supra note 4 (which concluded that a sitting president cannot be prose-
cuted in office, although criminal prosecution can be commenced either upon completion of the 
president’s term in office or subsequent to removal by conviction in the Senate).  This is why Pres-
ident Ford pardoned former President Nixon after Nixon resigned the Presidency in August 1974.  
See also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 65, 69, 77 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 70. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2(2). 
 71. See, e.g., the White House’s refusal to comply with Congressional subpoenas during the 
first Trump impeachment involving the Ukraine matter. 
 72. It was only because the White House tapes evidenced lawlessness at the highest levels 
that support for the President within his own party collapsed and Nixon was forced to resign to 
preempt conviction and removal by the Senate.  Nixon, moreover, remains the only president forced 
from office based on an impeachment investigation. 
 73. Baker, supra note 3. 
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appointment of a Special Prosecutor is no panacea.  Nor are legislative inno-
vations to immunize prosecutors from executive branch oversight.  
For example, a Democratic Congress enacted, and President Carter 
signed into law the now expire Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (“Act”) to 
prevent a repeat of the “Saturday Night Massacre” and institutionalize a 
means of protecting against Presidential abuse of power.74  Under Title Five 
of the Act, the “independent counsel” could investigate and, if appropriate, 
prosecute high-ranking Government officials for violation of federal crimi-
nal laws.75  It required the Attorney General, upon receipt of information 
deemed sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate whether any person 
covered by the Act may have violated a federal criminal law, to conduct a 
preliminary investigation of the matter.76  After the Attorney General either 
completed this investigation, or ninety days elapsed, the Attorney General 
was required to report to a special court (the Special Division), a three judge 
panel of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, created by the 
Act for the purpose of appointing independent counsels, such that if the AG 
determined there were no reasonable grounds to believe that further investi-
gation was warranted, the Attorney General must so notify the Special Divi-
sion.77  If, however, there were reasonable grounds to believe further inves-
tigation or prosecution was warranted, then the Attorney General must apply 
for the appointment of an independent counsel under the Act (emphasis 
added).78  Upon receiving this application, the Special Division appointed an 
independent counsel with full power and independent authority to exercise 
all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department 
of Justice.79  The independent counsel could be removed from office only by 
a) impeachment and conviction by Congress; or b) by personal action by the 
Attorney General for “good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or 
any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such inde-
pendent counsel’s duties.”80   
Although the Supreme Court, in Morrison, concluded that both the 
appointment and removal provisions were consistent with the “Appoint-
ments” and “Take Care” clauses, Justice Scalia, in dissent, concluded the Act 
was unconstitutional because the independent counsel, clothed with such 
 
 74. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, titles I–V, 92 Stat. 1824–1867 
(1978) (current version 28 U.S.C. § 591). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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immense prosecutorial power, is a high executive official who can only serve 
at the president’s pleasure and therefore cannot be appointed by the judicial 
branch.81  Recognizing Scalia’s perspective was then in the minority, his dis-
sent has become canonical, especially since Independent Counsel Kenneth 
Starr’s lengthy investigation resulted in the highly unpopular impeachment 
and subsequent acquittal of former President Clinton based on Clinton’s lies, 
cover-up, and suborning of perjury related to an improper sexual affair he 
had with a female White House intern.82  Consequently, both major political 
parties consented to the Act’s expiration in 1999 based on the manifest evi-
dence of prosecutorial overreach adumbrated in Scalia’s Morrison dissent.  
As a result, the Justice Department under then-Attorney General Reno issued 
the current Special Counsel Regulations as emergency regulations, without 
notice and comment, to provide future attorneys general the ability to appoint 
Special Counsel absent statutory authorization.83  It was under these Special 
Counsel Regulations that Mueller was appointed by then-Acting Attorney 
General Rod Rosenstein after the then-Attorney General, Jefferson Sessions 
III, recused himself from the Justice Department’s Russia Investigation.  It 
is to the Report and its principal findings and conclusions that this paper now 
turns. 
 
V. The Report’s Key Findings of Fact 
 
On May 17, 2017, “to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the 
Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election,” 
especially after Trump fired then-FBI Director James Comey, the then-Act-
ing Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein, appointed Special Counsel Mueller 
to investigate “any links and/or coordination between the Russian govern-
ment and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald 
Trump”  as well as matters arising directly from the investigation and other 
matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. 600.4 through 600.10, which, among 
other things, covers efforts to interfere and obstruct the investigation.84  The 
Report was delivered confidentially to Barr on March 22, 2019.85  It high-
lights numerous findings of fact as to Russian Government in the U.S. 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (con-
ceding that legislative limitations imposed on the removal of executive officials are constitutionally 
problematic and invalidating the removal provision of the Sarbanes Oxley Act’s Public Company 
Oversight Board).  
 83. 28 C.F.R. 600 et seq. (1999). 
 84. Id. at vol. 1, pp. 8, 11. 
 85. Sharon LaFraniere and Katie Benner, Mueller Delivers Report on Trump Russia Investi-
gation to Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/03/22/us/politics/mueller-report.html. 
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presidential election, contacts between Russian officials and the Trump 
Campaign and subsequent presidential abuses of power.86 
The Report divided the President’s actions into two phases.87  The 
first involved the period up to Comey’s firing when the President had been 
told repeatedly that he was not under investigation.88  The second phase in-
volved the time period after the Special Counsel was appointed and the Pres-
ident learned he was personally being investigated in an obstruction-of-jus-
tice inquiry.89  In this phase, the President publicly attacked the investigation, 
privately undertook efforts to control it, and publicly and privately encour-
aged witnesses not to cooperate.90  The Report evaluated the President’s mo-
tives using a totality of circumstances approach.91  
After a detailed analysis demonstrating the Russian Federation in-
tervened in the 2016 presidential election, the Report concluded that the ev-
idence was insufficient to charge any Trump Campaign official as an unreg-
istered Russian government agent or other Russian principal.92  The Report 
further concluded that the evidence was insufficient to charge that any mem-
ber of the Trump Campaign conspired with Russian government officials to 
interfere in the 2016 Presidential election.93  The Report wrote that there was 
no proven coordination or conspiracy between the Russian government and 
Trump Campaign to alter the election outcome, including with respect to 
Russia providing assistance to the Campaign in exchange for favorable treat-
ment in the future.94  That said, candidate Trump’s public statements and 
those of his campaign aides would have made Russian assistance more 
likely.  These statements, at a minimum, conveyed to the Russians that their  
interests would definitively be further under a Trump Administration.95  This 
is because candidate Trump consistently spoke admiringly of President 
Putin, Trump campaign members met on several occasions with Russian of-
ficials, evidencing a willingness to, at the very least, normalize relations be-
tween the two countries and welcome campaign assistance from Russian-
backed entities.96  Mueller chose not to prosecute Trump officials with con-
spiracy because it could not establish that they were involved in a criminal 
 
 86. See THE REPORT, supra note 4. 
 87. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, pp. 7, 158. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at vol. 1, p. 9. 
 93. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 1, p. 9. 
 94. Id. at p. 66. 
 95. Id. at p. 173. 
 96. Id. 
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conspiracy, which, of course, is very difficult to prove. The Report makes 
clear, however, that this does not absolve either the President or his Cam-
paign from political accountability for soliciting and accepting assistance 
from a hostile government.97 
The President, however, reacted to news of Mueller’s appointment 
as Special Counsel by telling advisors that it was “the end of his presidency” 
and demanding that former Attorney General Sessions resign.98  Sessions 
submitted his resignation by letter, which the President ultimately did not 
accept.99  The President then directed former White House Counsel Donald 
McGahn to fire the Special Counsel, but McGahn did not carry out the order, 
stating that he would rather resign than trigger what he considered to be an-
other Saturday Night Massacre.100  By June 2017, Trump became aware of 
emails setting up a June 9, 2016 meeting between senior Trump campaign 
and Russian government officials who offered derogatory information on the 
Clinton campaign as part of Russian government’s support for candidate 
Trump.101  On multiple occasions in late June and early July 2017, Trump 
directed aides not to publicly disclose the emails and then he dictated a state-
ment about the meeting to be issued by his son, Donald Trump Jr., wrongly 
describing the meeting as about adoptions from Russia.102  When the press 
asked questions regarding former President Trump’s involvement in editing 
his son’s statement, Trump’s personal lawyer lied by repeatedly denying the 
President played any role in editing Don Jr.’s message.103 
In early Summer 2017, the President called Sessions at his home and 
once again asked him to reverse his recusal decision in the Russia investiga-
tion, which Sessions refused.104  In October 2017, Trump met with Sessions 
at the Oval Office and asked him to take a look at investigating Hillary Clin-
ton.105  In December 2017, the President met with Sessions at the Oval Office 
after his former National Security Advisor, Michael Flynn, plead guilty to a 
felony conviction and advised Sessions that he would be a “hero” if he un-
recused and took back control of the Russia election interference investiga-
tion.106  The President also repeatedly claimed the Special Counsel had a 
conflict of interest that merited his being removed from the Russia 
 
 97. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 1, p. 175. 
 98. Id. at vol. 2, p. 4. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at p. 4, 88. 
 101. Id. at p. 4, 98. 
 102. Id. 
 103. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, p. 5. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at p. 5. 
 106. Id. 
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investigation.107  This claim by the President and his personal lawyer was 
rejected as incorrect not only by McGahn, but by the Acting Attorney Gen-
eral for the Russia Investigation, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosen-
stein.108 
In early 2018, it was reported that the President, in June 2017, or-
dered McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed and that McGahn re-
sponded by saying he would rather resign than carry out the order.109  
McGahn was then pressured by Trump to deny to officials that he had been 
instructed to fire Mueller and was questioned by Trump as to why he advised 
the Special Counsel as such and took notes of their meetings.110  McGahn 
felt Trump was testing his mettle and was prepared to resign over what he 
perceived to be an improper directive by the President to fire the Special 
Counsel and do “other crazy shit” at the President’s behest.  McGahn, who 
communicated this to his own personal lawyer, was dissuaded from resign-
ing by both his then White House Chief of Staff, Reince Priebus and his then 
White House Chief of Staff, Steve Bannon.111 
The Special Counsel concluded that the President’s subsequent 
claims that he did not direct McGahn to fire the Special Counsel were untrue 
based on McGahn’s credibility and lack of motivation to lie, his clear recol-
lection of events, and his preparation to resign over the President’s request 
to improperly convey information to Rosenstein.112 
The Report concluded that substantial evidence demonstrates the 
President’s repeated attempts to remove the Special Counsel were based on 
the Special Counsel’s oversight investigations that involved the President’s 
conduct and to reports that the Special Counsel was investigating the Presi-
dent for potential obstruction of justice.113  The Report further concluded that 
the President knew that he was acting improperly by ordering  McGahn to 
fire the Special Counsel.114  The Report also stated that the reason the Presi-
dent wanted Sessions to unrecuse was to have him take back control of the 
Russia investigation and protect himself from the Special Counsel’s investi-
gation.115 
The day after the 2018 mid-term elections, when it was clear that the 
Republican Party had increased its majority in the U.S. Senate, Trump fired 
 
 107. Id. at pp. 82–3. 
 108. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, pp. 82–3. 
 109. Id. at p. 6. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at p. 87. 
 112. Id. at p. 88. 
 113. Id. at p. 89. 
 114. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, p. 90. 
 115. Id. at p. 113 
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Sessions and replaced him with Sessions’ Chief of Staff as Acting Attorney 
General.116  After the New York Times reported that Trump had ordered 
McGahn to fire the Special Counsel, Trump ordered McGahn to publicly 
deny the report.  McGahn, who refused to do so, was rebuked by Trump for 
taking notes of his meetings with the former President and telling the Special 
Counsel that Trump ordered him to fire the Special Counsel.117  
Trump Campaign Chairman Paul Manafort was hired by Trump 
without pay after being recommended by Trump associates Thomas Barrack 
and Roger Stone.118  Though unpaid, Manafort’s position would increase the 
likelihood he would paid for past work in the amount of $2 million by Rus-
sian Oligarch Oleg Deripaska, and result in Deripaska dropping a lawsuit 
against him.119  Manafort’s plan was also to monetize his relationship with 
Trump by acting as a compensated go-between while remaining outside the 
Administration should Trump win the presidency.120  Manafort had connec-
tions to Russia through Deripaska and later through his work for former Pres-
ident Yanukovych’s pro-Russian regime in Ukraine.121  He stayed in touch 
with these contacts during the campaign through Konstantin Kilimnik, a 
longtime Manafort aide, who previously ran Manafort’s Kiev office and who 
the FBI assesses as having ties to Russian intelligence.122  Indeed, Manafort 
instructed his deputy, Rick Gates, to share internal polling data with 
Kilimnik during the campaign. Manafort also corresponded via Kilimnik 
with former Ukrainian President Yanukovych regarding a Ukrainian Peace 
Plan that would require U.S. support to succeed.  The Special Prosecutor’s 
office was unable to confirm that this information was shared with Trump 
and Manafort was forced to resign his position from the Trump Campaign in 
August 2016 due to media reports of his consulting work for the pro-Russian 
Party of Regions in Ukraine.123 
During Manafort’s subsequent prosecution for lying to federal pros-
ecutors, when the jury was deliberating, Trump made public comments sup-
portive of Manafort and, after his conviction, said that Manafort was right 
not to cooperate with prosecutors, that “flipping” ought to outlawed and 
made it known that Manafort could receive a pardon.124  The Report con-
cluded that the President’s conduct toward Flynn and Manafort qualify as 
obstructive and would typically support obstruction of justice charges as they 
 
 116. Id. at p. 110. 
 117. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, pp. 113, 117.   
 118. Id. at vol. 1, p. 134. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at p. 135.  
 121. Id. at p. 129. 
 122. Id. 
 123. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 1, pp. 129, 141, 144. 
 124. Id. at vol. 2, p. 6. 
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were both witnesses in the Special Counsel’s investigation, and the Presi-
dent’s conduct was intended to prevent both men from testifying truthfully, 
or otherwise would have the probable effect of influencing, delaying or pre-
venting their testimony to law enforcement.125   
The President’s conduct involving his personal lawyer, Michael Co-
hen, changed from praise for Cohen when Cohen falsely minimized Trump’s 
involvement in the Trump Moscow real estate development project, to cas-
tigation when Cohen became a cooperating witness.126  From September 
2015 to June 2016, Cohen had pursued the project on the Trump Organiza-
tion’s behalf and briefed candidate Trump on it numerous times, including 
whether the candidate should travel to Russia to advance the deal.127  In 2017, 
Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the project, including stat-
ing that he only briefed Trump on the project three times and never discussed 
travel to Russia with him, in an effort to adhere to a “party line” that sought 
to minimize the President’s connections to Russia.128  After FBI investigators 
raided Cohen’s home and office in April 2018, Trump publicly asserted that 
Cohen would not flip and told Cohen to not cooperate with prosecutors and 
to “stay strong” and privately passed messages of support to him.129  Cohen 
said that he had discussions with Trump’s personal counsel and believed that 
if he stayed on message he would be “taken care of.”130  However, after Co-
hen began cooperating with the government in the summer of 2018, the Pres-
ident referred to him as a “weak person,” publicly criticized him, calling him 
a “rat,” suggested his family had committed crimes and that he should serve 
prison time.131   
The Report concluded that Trump’s actions regarding Cohen can 
constitute obstruction of justice as the then-President was aware of Cohen’s 
false testimony to Congress, that he was, after Cohen’s guilty plea, con-
cerned about what Cohen would tell investigators regarding the Trump 
Tower Moscow project, and therefore sought to deter Cohen from cooperat-
ing with prosecutors.132 
 
VI. The Report’s Key Conclusions of Law 
 
 
 125. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, p. 131. 
 126. Id. at p. 6. 
 127. Id. at p. 134.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at pp. 6, 134. 
 130. Id. 
 131. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, pp. 134, 149, 150, 151. 
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The Report states that former President Trump, as head of the Exec-
utive Branch, had means of affecting the Russia investigation that are rele-
vant to an obstruction of justice charge beyond the purview of a typical ob-
struction of justice case because some of his actions, including the firing of 
former FBI Director Comey, “are facially lawful acts within his Article II 
authority.”133  However, the Trump’s position as head of the Executive 
Branch provided him with unique and powerful means of influencing official 
proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses, which is “relevant 
to a potential obstruction-of-justice analysis.”134  Second, the lack of proof 
of an underlying conspiracy crime committed by Trump related to Russian 
election interference also affects the analysis by requiring consideration of 
the possible motives of his conduct.135  The fact that many of the former 
President’s acts directed at witnesses, including discouraging their coopera-
tion with prosecutors and suggesting possible future pardons, took place in 
public does not, according to the Report, immunize them from the reach of 
obstruction laws, i.e. the analysis is the same as for private acts because the 
likely effect of the former President’s conduct was to influence witnesses or 
alter their testimony to the detriment of the justice system’s integrity.136 
The Report rejected the President’s personal counsel’s claim that the 
obstruction of justice statutes do not cover the President’s actions because 
this is neither the position of the DOJ, nor is it supported by principles of 
statutory construction.137  To illustrate, the federal obstruction of justice stat-
ute, in relevant part, prohibits all persons from corruptly obstructing, influ-
encing or impeding any official proceeding, or attempting to do so.138  The 
Report highlighted that the statute applies to all corrupt means of obstructing 
a proceeding, pending or contemplated, “including by improper exercises of 
official power.”139  Furthermore, the Report set forth that the statute covers 
a wide array of obstructive conduct, including the improper use of govern-
ment processes, (see e.g., the Watergate cover-up perpetrated by White 
House officials and President Nixon).140  It also applies to those improperly 
seeking to subvert, impede or obstruct a relevant judicial proceeding.141  The 
Report concluded that the President’s claim that his conduct falls outside the 
scope of obstruction laws “lacks merit”142 such that the President lacked a 
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legitimate statutory defense to a potential criminal obstruction of justice 
charge.143  
With respect to Constitutional defenses, the Report concluded that 
the President is subject to the same obstruction of justice statutes as a private 
citizen when his conduct does not implicate presidential constitutional au-
thority.144  With respect to whether a president can obstruct justice by exer-
cising his Article II powers, the Report concluded “that Congress has author-
ity to prohibit a president’s corrupt use of his authority in order to protect the 
administration of justice.”145  This “accords with our constitutional system 
of checks and balances and the principle that no person is above the law.”146  
The Report concluded that the President’s claim that his conduct falls outside 
the scope of obstruction laws “lacks merit.”147 
Although the president has constitutional power “to take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed” and direct criminal investigations, as well as 
the power to appoint and remove all officers of the United States, the Report 
concluded that this does not provide a constitutional defense to an obstruc-
tion charge because when the President’s official actions come into conflict 
with prohibitions in the obstruction statutes because “any constitutional ten-
sion is reconciled through separation of powers analysis.”148  Furthermore, 
Congress can validly regulate the president’s official duties to prohibit ac-
tions motivated by corrupt intent to obstruct justice consistent with the pres-
ident’s Article II power because Congress can validly make obstruction stat-
utes applicable to corruptly motivated Presidential official acts without 
impermissibly undermining his Article II functions.149  Indeed, the Report 
concluded that protection of the criminal justice system from any person’s 
corrupt acts–including the president–accords with the fundamental principle 
of our government that “no person in this country is so high that he is above 
the law.”150 
 
VII. The Report’s Decision Not to Prosecute 
 
The Report adopted the DOJ’s position that a sitting president can-
not be indicted for obstruction of justice and because of this, declined against 
 
 143. Id. at pp. 7–8, 159. 
 144. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, p. 8. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at vol. 2, p. 8 
 147. Id. at pp. 7, 168. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at vol. 2, p. 169. 
 150. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2, pp. 180–81 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 
196, 220 (1882)). 
PRESIDENTIAL IMPUNITY AND THE MUELLER REPORT 
560  HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY Vol. 48:4 
 
making a prosecutorial judgment.151  The Report, however, rejected the Pres-
ident’s lawyers claims that the President has Article II authority to obstruct 
official proceedings consistent with separation of powers.152  However, 
“while the [Report] does not conclude that the President committed a crime, 
it also does not exonerate him.”153  Because the Report  concludes that though 
Trump cannot be criminally prosecuted while in office, it strongly states that 
he is not immune from accountability by leaving open impeachment and re-
moval as an option available to Congress followed by a subsequent criminal 
prosecution.154  The Report concludes that one of its purposes is to conduct 
a thorough factual investigation and preserve evidence while memories are 
fresh and documentary materials are still available, to facilitate a potential 
prosecution of the President upon his departure from office.155   
Looking at the President’s actions outlined above, the Special Coun-
sel “determined that there was a sufficient factual and legal basis to further 
investigate potential obstruction-of-justice issues involving the Presi-
dent.”156  The former President refused to provide written answers regarding 
obstruction of justice matters to the Special Counsel, and notwithstanding 
the fact that the Special Counsel believed there was constitutional authority 
to compel the President’s testimony regarding obstruction of justice via 
grand jury subpoena, Mueller chose not to do so.157  Mueller cited to “the 
substantial delay that such an investigative step would likely produce at 
[such] a late stage of [the] investigation,” and the significant body of evi-
dence that was already obtained from the President’s actions and his public 
and private statements describing or explaining those actions, including his 
manifest concern that the intelligence community’s assessment of Russian 
election interference on his behalf jeopardized the legitimacy of his presi-
dency.158  The Report, moreover, made a point of not exonerating the Presi-
dent, stating that the Special Counsel was prepared to exonerate the President 
but could not.159  
This inability to exonerate the President stems from the many in-
stances of obstruction of justice outlined above.  The Report, however, did 
not state that the President engaged in criminal conduct because such a state-
ment would be, according to Mueller, improper and conflict with the 
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President’s immunity from criminal prosecution while in office.160  There are 
four key points regarding Mueller’s reticence. 
First, because the OLC made a legal conclusion that a sitting presi-
dent cannot be indicted, as this would impermissibly undermine the Execu-
tive Branch’s capacity to perform its constitutionally assigned functions, the 
Special Counsel declined to make a prosecutorial recommendation.  In the 
Report, Mueller states, “we recognized that a federal criminal accusation 
against a sitting President would place burdens on the President’s capacity 
to govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes . . . .”161 
Second, while the OLC opinion concludes a sitting president cannot 
be prosecuted, it facilitates accountability and the rule of law by allowing for 
a criminal investigation during the president’s term of office, such that exec-
utive officials other than the president can be criminally prosecuted for ob-
struction offenses during the president’s term, subject, of course, to the pres-
ident’s pardon power.162  It also facilitates the proper collection of evidence 
to ensure accountability.  This is why the Report set forth that “[G]iven these 
considerations, the facts known to us, and the strong public interest in safe-
guarding the integrity of the criminal justice system, we conducted a thor-
ough factual investigation in order to preserve the evidence when memories 
were fresh and documentary materials were available.”163 
Third, Mueller decided not to apply an approach that could poten-
tially result in a conclusion that the President engaged in behavior that “con-
stitutes a federal offense.”164  Mueller decided against reaching such a con-
clusion because the ordinary means for a person to respond to a criminal 
accusation, namely, a speedy public trial, with all the procedural protections 
attendant to a criminal case, are unavailable to a sitting president, i.e. a “pros-
ecutor’s judgment that crimes were committed, but that no charges will be 
brought, affords no such adversarial opportunity for a public name-clearing 
before an impartial adjudicator.”165  This, in turn, also precluded the use of 
an internal document such as a sealed indictment because it “could carry 
consequences that extend beyond the realm of criminal justice” and could 
imperil a president’s ability to govern.166  Moreover, although a prosecutor’s 
internal report would not represent a formal public accusation akin to an in-
dictment, the possibility of its public disclosure and the absence of a neutral 
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adjudicatory forum to review its findings counseled against potentially de-
termining that the President’s conduct constitutes a federal offense.167 
Fourth, the Special Counsel set forth that if he had confidence that 
the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, “we would so 
state.”168  Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, however, 
“we are unable to reach that judgment.”169   
 
VIII. What the Report Might Have, But Did Not State 
 
 The Report adopted the OLC’s conclusion that a sitting President 
cannot be criminally prosecuted during his term of office such that the rem-
edies to presidential criminality are: (1) impeachment in the House followed 
by trial and conviction by the Senate; (2) the president’s loss of reelection 
based on public revulsion by his behavior, and potentially; (3) criminal pros-
ecution of the president upon his departure from office.  Far from exonerat-
ing the President, however, the Report reads like a depressing indictment of 
a temperamental mafia boss with no understanding of the American system 
of government or the rule of law.  Mueller’s refusal to describe the former 
President’s actions as criminal enabled Barr to publicly mischaracterize the 
Report, such that Trump and his supporters were subsequently able to effec-
tively characterize the Report as a complete exoneration and as the “Russia 
hoax.”  As evidenced by the Senate’s decision to acquit the former President 
of the abuse of power charges brought by the House regarding his repeated 
attempts to coerce the Government of Ukraine to open a criminal investiga-
tion into his political rival, the Report’s failure to elicit the proper response 
in the political culture has led to a framework whereby the majority of Re-
publican voters see the President as unfairly persecuted and innocent.  This, 
in turn, worsens the problem of presidential impunity by, to paraphrase 
Émile Durkheim, further defining deviancy downward.  
 Presidential impunity in this case, however, required an unprincipled 
and partisan former Attorney General who was willing to exploit the Special 
Counsel’s exceeding caution and reticence to mislead the public, and thereby 
politically strengthen his boss.  This was facilitated by a defect in the Special 
Counsel Regulations that required Mueller to confidentially submit his report 
to Barr, while entitling the former Attorney General to submit an unverifia-
ble letter synopsis of the Report’s conclusions to Congress without, at the 
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same time, disclosing the full Report.170  As set forth more fully below, Barr 
masterfully exploited this defect for maximum political effect.    
 
IX. Attorney General Barr’s Executive Summary and Subsequent 
Characterization of the Report 
 
 The DOJ Special Counsel Regulations provide that a Special Coun-
sel “shall provide the Attorney General with a confidential report explaining 
the prosecution or declination decisions reached by the Special Counsel.”171  
The Attorney General, in turn, “will notify the Chairman and Ranking Mem-
ber of the Judiciary Committees of each House of Congress, with an expla-
nation for each action [u]pon conclusion of the Special Counsel[’]s investi-
gation . . . .”172  In short, the Special Counsel Regulations, interposed as they 
were without notice and comment feedback, entitled Barr to keep the Report 
secret and provide Congress with an unrebuttable synopsis of its conclusions.  
He did this via letter dated March 22, 2019 to Senate Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Graham, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Nadler, Senate 
Judiciary Ranking Member Feinstein, and House Judiciary Committee 
Ranking Member Collins and the March 24 Letter.  The March 22, 2019 
letter advised Congress that Special Counsel Mueller had concluded his in-
vestigation and had submitted to him a “confidential report explaining the 
prosecution or declination decisions he ha[d] reached, as required by 28 
C.F.R. 600.8 (c).”173  It concluded by stating that “I may be in a position to 
advise you of the Special Counsel’s principal conclusions as soon as this 
weekend.”174  The March 24, 2019 letter (“March 24 Letter”) set forth the 
following: 
 
1.  “The Special Counsel’s investigation did not find that the Trump 
Campaign or anyone associated with it conspired or coordinated 
with Russia in its efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential elec-
tion.”175 
2.  “The Special Counsel concluded that Russian government actors 
successfully hacked into computers and obtained emails from 
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persons affiliated with the Clinton campaign and Democratic Party 
organizations, and publicly disseminated those materials through 
various intermediaries, including WikiLeaks.”176 
3. With respect to the crime of Obstruction of Justice, after making a 
thorough factual investigation, the Special Counsel chose not to 
make a traditional prosecutorial judgment regarding the President’s 
activities, and “therefore did not draw a conclusion–one way or the 
other—as to whether the examined conduct constituted obstruc-
tion.”177 
4. “The Special Counsel’s decision to describe the facts of his obstruc-
tion investigation without reaching any legal conclusions leaves it to 
the Attorney General to determine whether the conduct described in 
the report constitutes a crime.”178 
5. Both Barr and Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein “concluded that 
the evidence developed during the Special Counsel’s investigation 
is not sufficient to establish that the President committed an obstruc-
tion-of-justice offense,” and that, “while not determinative, the ab-
sence of such evidence bears upon President Trump’s intent with 
respect to obstruction.”179  “Our determination was made without re-
gard to, and is not based on, the constitutional considerations that 
surround the indictment and criminal prosecution of a sitting presi-
dent.”180 
6. This, in turn, is based on the Report’s conclusion that the “President 
was not involved in an underlying crime with respect to Russian 
election interference,” and “the absence of such evidence bears upon 
the President’s intent with respect to obstruction.”181 
7. The Report “identifies no actions that, in our judgment, constitute 
obstructive conduct, had a nexus to a pending or contemplated pro-
ceeding, and were done with corrupt intent . . . .”182 
8. Barr intended to “move forward expeditiously in determining” what 
information in the Report “can be released in light of applicable law, 
regulations and Departmental policies.”183 
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9. That public release of the notification letter, per 28 C.F.R. Section 
600.9 (c), is in the public interest and will be disclosed to the pub-
lic.184  
 
On March 27, 2019, Special Counsel Mueller, in a letter to Barr, set 
forth that the representations made in the March 24 Letter “did not fully cap-
ture the context, nature, and substance of the Special Counsel’s Office’s 
work and conclusions.”185  According to Mueller, the March 24 Letter sowed 
“public confusion about critical aspects of the results of his investigation,” 
which, Mueller noted “threatened to undermine a central purpose for which 
the Department appointed Special Counsel Mueller: to assure full public 
confidence in the outcome of the investigations.”186  
On March 29, 2019, Barr, in a letter addressed to Chairmen Graham 
and Nadler, represented that “some media reports and other public state-
ments mischaracterized [his] March 24, 2019 [letter] as a ‘summary’ of the 
Special Counsel’s investigation and the report.”187  It also stated that his 
March 24 Letter “was not, and did not purport to be, an exhaustive recount-
ing of Special Counsel’s investigation or report.”188  The letter stated that 
everyone “will soon be able to read [the Report] on their own.”189 
Prior to disclosing the Report,  Barr held a press conference on April 
18, 2019 and stated that Special Counsel Mueller’s “investigation did not 
establish that members of the Trump campaign conspired or coordinated 
with the Russian government in its election interference activities.”190  Barr 
said that, “we now know that the Russian operatives who perpetrated these 
schemes did not have the cooperation of President Trump or the Trump cam-
paign—or the knowing assistance of any other Americans for that matter.”191  
Barr stated that the “bottom line” is that “after nearly two years of investiga-
tion, thousands of subpoenas, and hundreds of warrants and witness inter-
views,” Mueller did not find that the “Trump campaign or other Americans 
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colluded” in Russian government sponsored efforts to interfere in the 2016 
presidential election.192  Finally, Barr announced that he and Rosenstein 
“concluded that the evidence developed by Special Counsel Mueller is not 
sufficient to establish that President Trump committed an obstruction-of-jus-
tice offense.”193 He declared that- 
 
[i]n assessing President Trump’s actions… it is important to 
bear in mind the context. President Trump faced an unprec-
edented situation.  As he entered into office, and sought to 
perform his responsibilities as president, federal agents and 
prosecutors were scrutinizing his conduct before and after 
taking office, and the conduct of some of his associates.  At 
the same time, there was relentless speculation in the news 
media about the President’s personal culpability.  Yet, as he 
said from the beginning, there was in fact no collusion.  And 
as [the Report] acknowledges, there is substantial evidence 
to show that President Trump was frustrated and angered by 
a sincere belief that the investigation was undermining his 
presidency, propelled by his political opponents, and fueled 
by illegal leaks.  Nonetheless, the White House fully coop-
erated with Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation, provid-
ing unfettered access to campaign and White House docu-
ments, directing senior aides to testify freely, and asserting 
no privilege claims.  And at the same time, President Trump 
took no act that in fact deprived Special Counsel Mueller of 
the documents and witnesses necessary to complete his in-
vestigation.  Apart from whether the acts were obstructive, 
this evidence of non-corrupt motives weighs heavily against 
any allegation that President Trump had a corrupt intent to 
obstruct the investigation.194 
 
That same day, Barr also released a letter to members of Congress 
purporting to summarize the Report’s conclusions (“April 18 Letter”).195  
The April 18 Letter set forth that Special Counsel Mueller’s “bottom line 
conclusion on the question of so-called collusion was that the investigation 
did not establish that members of the Trump campaign conspired or coordi-
nated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.196  
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It also stated that in light of Mueller’s “decision not to reach a conclusion on 
whether President Trump obstructed justice,” the evidence set forth in the 
Report was not sufficient to establish that President Trump committed an 
obstruction-of-justice offense.”197 
Barr’s misleading and highly partisan statements were all that were 
made public between Mueller’s March 22, 2019 confidential filing of the 
Report and April 19, 2019, when the redacted Report was finally made pub-
lic. Barr’s characterizations of the Report have proved determinative. 
Barr systematically misled Congress and the public in numerous 
ways.  First, he elided over the fact that the Russian Government deliberately 
sought to assist the Trump candidacy and undermine the Clinton Cam-
paign.198  Although Mueller found no proof that candidate Trump conspired 
with Russia to alter the election outcome, the Report did mention, on several 
occasions, that candidate Trump and his Campaign officials were more than 
willing to receive campaign assistance from Russia that may well explain the 
President’s subsequent attempts to undermine the Special Counsel investi-
gation.199  Indeed, what both the Report and Barr’s letters fail to state is that 
a conspiracy between the Trump Campaign and the Russian Government 
would have been both unnecessary and unhelpful from the Russian Govern-
ment’s perspective because only Russia and not the Trump Campaign had 
the expertise to alter the election campaign using social media disinfor-
mation and computer hacking and evidence of a conspiracy with Trump or 
his campaign would only have harmed Russia’s interests regardless of who 
won the election.   
Second, the March 24 Letter and the April 18 Letter state that the 
Report chose not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment.  Though true 
in the strictest sense, it completely omitted the reason, namely that per the 
DOJ guidelines as outlined in the OLC memo, a sitting president is immune 
from criminal prosecution and it would be accordingly unfair to publicly 
make a prosecutorial judgment against a president unable to clear his name 
via a speedy adjudication.200  Indeed, both the March 24 Letter and the April 
18 Letter systematically omitted the Report’s detailed itemization of Presi-
dential obstructive conduct that would merit obstruction charges.201  The Re-
port’s detailed listing of presidential misbehavior, its conclusion that the 
President cannot be exonerated on an obstruction charge, and its conclusion 
 
 197. March 24 Letter, supra note 9. 
 198. THE REPORT, supra note 4, at vol. 2 pp. 4–5. 
 199. Id. at vol. 2, pp. 5–7, 24. 
 200. Id. at vol. 2, p. 8.  
 201. Id. at vol. 2, pp. 75–6, 82–3, 88–89, 92–93, 98, 113, 117, 131, 134, 149, 150–51 and 155–
57. 
PRESIDENTIAL IMPUNITY AND THE MUELLER REPORT 
568  HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY Vol. 48:4 
 
that it preserved testimony and evidence for a potential prosecution of the 
President upon his departure from office, shows Mueller clearly felt that the 
President engaged in criminal conduct but prudentially could not say so in 
view of presidential immunity.202  While both letters correctly state that 
Mueller chose not the make a prosecution recommendation, Barr falsely im-
plied that this was because Mueller did not find sufficient evidence of presi-
dential wrongdoing and incorrectly stated that it was left to Barr to determine 
whether the President committed a crime.203 
Third, both the March 24 and April 18 Letters state that the evidence 
in the Report is insufficient to establish that the President committed an ob-
struction offense.  This statement is, of course, belied by the Report’s ex-
haustive listing of presidential obstruction.204  
Fourth, both the March 24 Letter and the April 18 Letter incorrectly 
state that the lack of proof of an illegal conspiracy between the Trump Cam-
paign and the Russian Government supports a conclusion that the President 
did not have a reason to commit an obstruction offense.205  This statement, 
which appears nowhere in the Report, is contradicted by the fact the Report 
concluded the President may have feared that the Special Counsel investiga-
tion would reveal such a conspiracy and that evidence of Russian assistance 
to him and his campaign would undermine his legitimacy in office.206  
Fifth, both letters incorrectly state that the Special Counsel “identi-
fies no actions that, in our judgment, constitute obstructive conduct, had a 
nexus to a pending or contemplated proceeding, and were done with corrupt 
intent . . . .”207  This statement is definitively contradicted by the Report, 
which demonstrates that the President engaged in obstructive conduct to un-
dermine actual or contemplated criminal proceedings involving former Na-
tional Security Advisor Michael Flynn, former Trump Campaign Manager 
Paul Manafort, and Trump’s personal lawyer Michael Cohen.208 
The March 24 Letter, the April 18 Letter, Barr’s testimony before 
Congress, and his subsequent press conference misled both Congress and the 
public as to the Report’s findings, and created unrebuttable narrative, for al-
most an entire month, that the Special Counsel declined to recommend pros-
ecution based on a lack of evidence of presidential misbehavior.  This was 
untrue and clearly contradicted by the eventually disclosed Report. However, 
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for a full month, the DOJ Special Counsel Regulations precluded Mueller 
and members of his team from publicly disputing Barr’s public statements.209  
United States District Court Judge Reggie Walton, no less, con-
cluded that he had “grave concerns about the objectivity of the process that 
preceded the public release of the redacted version of [the Report] and its 
impact on the DOJ’s subsequent justifications that its redactions of the Re-
port are authorized by the [Freedom of Information Act]” in adjudicating a 
suit seeking disclosure of the full unredacted Report brought by public inter-
est and media plaintiffs.210  In particular, Judge Walton’s decision denying 
DOJ summary judgment on the FOIA issue, set forth that he concurred with 
Mueller’s assessment, set forth in Mueller’s March 27 Letter to Barr, that the 
March 24 Letter “did not fully capture the context, nature, and substance of 
the Special Counsel’s Office’s work and conclusions.”211  Judge Walton’s 
decision set forth that “a review of the redacted version of [the Report] by 
the Court results in the Court’s concurrence with Special Counsel Mueller’s 
assessment that Attorney General Barr distorted the findings in [the Re-
port].”212  According to Judge Walton, Barr’s summary: 
 
failed to indicate that Special Counsel Mueller identified 
multiple contacts—‘links,’ in the words of the Appointment 
Order—between Trump [c]ampaign officials and individu-
als with ties to the Russian government,’ . . . and that Special 
Counsel Mueller only concluded that the investigation did 
not establish that ‘these contacts involved or resulted in co-
ordination or a conspiracy with the Trump [c]ampaign and 
Russia, including with respect to Russia providing assis-
tance to the [Trump] [c]ampaign in exchange for any sort of 
favorable treatment in the future,’ because coordination—
the term that appears in the Appointment Order—'does not 
have a settled definition in federal criminal law,’ (internal 
citations and parentheses omitted).213 
 
Judge Walton concluded that although Barr can be “commended for 
his effort to expeditiously release a summary of Special Counsel Mueller’s 
principal conclusions in the public interest, “the Court is troubled by his 
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hurried release of [the March 24 Letter] well in advance of when the redacted 
version of [the Report] was ultimately made available to the public.”214  
Judge Walton writes: 
 
[t]he speech by which Attorney General released to the pub-
lic the summary of Special Counsel Mueller’s principal con-
clusions, coupled with the fact that Attorney General Barr 
failed to provide a thorough representation of the findings 
set forth in [the Report], causes the Court to question 
whether Attorney General Barr’s intent was to create a one-
sided narrative about [the Report]—a narrative that is 
clearly in some respects substantively at odds with the re-
dacted version of [the Report].215 
 
 Judge Walton further concluded that Barr’s decision to not only conduct a 
press conference but also issue the April 18 Letter immediately prior to re-
leasing the redacted version of the Report to the public “also causes the Court 
concern.”216  This is because Barr’s representations made during his April 
18, 2019 press conference and letter cannot be reconciled with the Report’s 
findings.217  This caused Judge Walton to “seriously question whether Attor-
ney General Barr made a calculated attempt to influence public discourse 
about the Report “in favor of President Trump despite certain findings in the 
redacted version of the Report to the contrary.”218   
Judge Walton is undoubtedly correct.  Barr’s dishonest March 24 
Letter ended up having a dispositive effect because by the time the fully re-
dacted Report was released nearly a full month later, the political culture had 
already been misled into believing that Mueller chose not to make a prose-
cutorial recommendation based on a lack of evidence.  This explains 
Mueller’s March 27 Letter to Barr disputing characterization of the Special 
Counsel’s report as failing “to capture the context, nature and substance” of 
the Russia investigation.219  Mueller’s letter set forth that Barr’s summary of 
the Report improperly framed the Report’s findings which created “public 
confusion about critical aspects of the results of our investigation” that 
“threaten[ed] to undermine a central purpose for which the Department ap-
pointed the Special Counsel: to assure full public confidence in the outcome 
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of the investigations.”220  To protect against this, Mueller recommended that 
the Report’s executive summaries be immediately made public because such 
disclosure would “alleviate the misunderstandings that have arisen and 
would answer congressional and public questions about the nature and out-
come of our investigation,” and would, per Barr’s letter to Congress, “be in 
the public interest.”221  Barr, however, failed to act on this request and instead 
allowed his letter’s misleading characterization of the Report’s findings to 
adumbrate the President’s claim of exoneration. 
An April 3, 2019 New York Times article set forth that members of 
the Special Counsel’s team were concerned that Barr’s incorrect first narra-
tive of the Special Counsel’s findings “will have hardened” Americans’ 
views “before the investigation’s conclusions become public.”222  Indeed, 
President Trump, no less, claimed “complete and total exoneration” based 
on the Barr letter and went so far as to call on “the Justice Department and 
his allies on Capitol Hill to investigate and hold accountable those responsi-
ble for opening the inquiry.”223  
Because the Barr letter was so misleading and Mueller and his team 
were bound by Justice Department confidentiality, Barr was able to solidify 
his incorrect claim of no obstruction by the President and undermine the po-
litical impact of the redacted Report when it was eventually made public.224  
As U.S. Senator Chris Coons put it to Barr, “A critical three weeks passed 
between when you delivered [the March 24 Letter] with the focus on the 
principal conclusions and when we ultimately got the redacted report . . . My 
concern is that gave President Trump and his folks more than three weeks of 
an open field to say, ‘I was completely exonerated.’”225   
Barr effectively defanged a damning Report that reads like a crimi-
nal indictment, or under these circumstances, an impeachment referral to 
Congress, by misleading Congress and the public as to the Report’s conclu-
sions and delaying the Report’s public release to mute its political effect.226  
This is because Congress, the press, and the public accepted the March 24 
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Letter as an authoritative synopsis of the Report’s conclusions.227  To illus-
trate, upon reviewing the March 24 Letter, House Speaker Pelosi said “I’m 
not for impeachment  . . . Unless there is something so compelling and over-
whelming and bipartisan, I don’t think we should go down that path, because 
it divides the country.”228  Highly regarded liberal media personalities ac-
cepted Barr’s characterization of the Report.229  National Public Radio’s Do-
menico Montanaro wrote:   
 
There’s nothing in [the Report], according to the Barr letter, 
that meets those thresholds.  If there was “something so 
compelling and overwhelming,” Barr would almost cer-
tainly have had to have written about it.  At best, Democrats 
will pull at the obstruction string, hoping for evidence in a 
fuller version of [the Report] or underlying documents that 
help make that case.230 
 
Montanaro went further to add that the March 24 Letter gave mo-
mentum to the President and his supporters’ claim of “no collusion” with 
Russia and enabled the President to characterize the Russia Investigation as 
“an illegal takedown that failed” and on Twitter, a “total 
EXONERATION.”231   
Republicans in Congress did not equivocate in their support for 
Trump.  An early Republican critic of the President, Senator Lindsey Gra-
ham, after reviewing the Barr letter, tweeted on the day of the letter’s release 
that it was a “[G]ood day for the rule of law, Great day for President Trump 
and his team, No collusion or obstruction, The Cloud hanging over President 
Trump has been removed by this report.”232  Two things are manifested from 
Senator Graham’s tweet.  First, he reads the Barr letter as a vindication of 
the President when even the letter clearly stated that the Special Counsel re-
fused to exonerate the President of obstruction.  Second, Graham did not 
distinguish the March 24 Letter from the Report that, at the time, remained 
unavailable.233  It evidences that Senator Graham, a very powerful and highly 
influential member of the U.S. Senate, was effectively misled by the March 
24 Letter into publicly adopting an exoneration narrative.  This, in turn, 
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dispositively prejudiced his view of the full Report when it was eventually 
released.  Senator Graham’s tweets are paradigmatic with respect to the Re-
publican Congressional caucus.  Subsequent calls for the President’s im-
peachment based on the Report were thereafter made solely by the most par-
tisan Democrats and did not include either Speaker Pelosi or members of her 
leadership team.234   
Barr facilitated the former President and his supporters’ ability to 
characterize the Report as an exoneration and the Russia Investigation itself 
as a partisan “witch hunt.”235  Problematically, it furthered the problem of 
presidential impunity by emboldening the President’s reckless instincts by 
furthering a narrative that the President has been unfairly investigated by his 
“deep state” and partisan opponents.236  The Reverend Franklin Graham 
called the President’s impeachment “an unjust inquisition”237 and suggested 
it was the work of a “demonic power.”238  Liberty University President Jerry 
Falwell, Jr. argued that Trump’s term of office should be extended by two 
years based on the “failed coup” against him.239  Others, including the en-
tirety of the Republican House caucus and nearly the entire Republican Sen-
ate caucus, have fallen into line fearing for their own political survival.240   
The March 24 Letter not only prevented the Report from eliciting a 
timely impeachment but facilitated presidential impunity and subsequent 
abuses of power by enabling the President and his supporters to 
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mischaracterize the Russia Investigation as a “witch hunt” and incorrectly 
claim the Report completely exonerated the President of any wrongdoing.  It 
also, tragically, furthered presidential impunity by facilitating the former 
President’s narrative that his political opponents, rather than legitimately be-
ing opposed to presidential abuse of power, were merely loath to accept his 
legitimacy in office and obsessed with his removal.  This narrative largely 
explains why the President’s impeachment in the Ukraine matter did not gain 
political traction with Republicans in either the House or the Senate, e.g. all 
197 Republicans in the House voted against impeaching the President and 
fifty-two out of fifty-three Senate Republicans vote to acquit after refusing 
to call any witnesses into Presidential abuse of power.241   It also explains 
why many of the President’s supporters, including the majority of Republi-
can voters nationwide, sided with Trump when he incorrectly and dishon-
estly claimed the 2020 presidential election was stolen from him.242 
 
X. Back to the Special Counsel Regulations 
 
All of this was tragically facilitated by a defect in the Special Coun-
sel Regulations that was neither seen nor anticipated when implemented 
without notice and comment in 1999, namely, that a sitting Attorney General 
would use the text of the Regulations to issue an incorrect report summary 
to effectively cover-up detailed evidence of presidential abuse of power and 
obstruction of justice.  The DOJ’s failure to subject the Special Counsel Reg-
ulations to notice and comment resulted in the final Regulations being prem-
ised on the supposition that the Attorney General would be a relatively non-
partisan such as Elliott Richardson or Janet Reno.  This was a naïve suppo-
sition that overlooked the partisan attorneys general of the past and failed to 
anticipate the political hyperpolarization of today.  The concern about an im-
proper political manipulation of the Special Counsel Regulations would have 
been evidenced were they to have been subjected to notice and comment 
under APA 553 because that is what notice-and-comment is designed to do. 
Submission of the Regulations for public comment would have brought forth 
public commentary from all components of civil society and ferreted out the 
defect while the Regulations were tentative such that their concerns could 
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have been addressed in the final Regulations.  In the end, the failure to sub-
ject the Special Counsel Regulations to notice-and-comment has resulted in 
a Special Counsel paradigm that not only fails to protect against presidential 
abuse of power, but actually facilitates abuse of power and presidential im-
punity in office by enabling a partisan attorney general to mischaracterize a 
special counsel report while keeping it confidential consistent with the Spe-
cial Counsel Regulations.  
Now that President Trump has departed from office, the Special 
Counsel Regulations should be submitted for notice and comment feedback 
by legal experts and the broader public.  At a minimum, the comments will 
recommend that the Regulations should no longer allow an attorney general 
to issue a Special Counsel report summary without disclosing the entire re-
dacted document to Congress and the public.  The comments may also rec-
ommend allowing the Special Counsel to speak to the media and testify be-
fore Congress during the Special Counsel’s investigation to protect the 
investigation’s integrity.  Recognizing the inordinately high threshold 
needed in the Senate to convict an impeached President, the current frame-
work to ensure against presidential abuses of power is not working.  I, there-
fore, recommend this simple improvement: subjecting the Special Counsel 





Special Counsel Mueller did an outstanding job at arriving at the 
truth with respect to Russian election interference in the 2016 presidential 
election.  However, based on his limited brief and his concern to maintain 
the proper separation of powers, the Report abjured a determination as to 
whether the former President committed crimes when he, on several occa-
sions, sought to scupper the investigation.  This decision to abjure a finding 
of criminality gave former Attorney General Barr the opportunity to mislead 
Congress and the public as to the Report’s conclusions, and this month-long 
head start was determinative.  Problematically, the lack of political response 
to the Report’s findings emboldened the President’s recklessness and fur-
thered his instinctive authoritarianism and contempt for the rule of law.  The 
paradigmatic explanations for this problem of presidential impunity include 
the hyper-partisanship that characterizes today’s Washington and the 
broader political culture, as well as profit-driven partisan media that furthers 
the nation’s partisan divide.  These explanations, though correct, are not suf-
ficient.  
PRESIDENTIAL IMPUNITY AND THE MUELLER REPORT 
576  HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY Vol. 48:4 
 
Presidential impunity in this administration is also attributable to in-
firmities in the DOJ Special Counsel Regulations that might have been fer-
reted out if they were submitted for notice and comment feedback when first 
implemented by former Attorney General Reno in 1999.  For reasons of po-
litical expediency, they have never since been revisited.  This must change.  
Special Counsel Regulations which require Special Counsel to submit their 
reports confidentially to the Attorney General, while the Attorney General 
can, in turn, submit unverifiable synopses of report conclusions to Congress, 
leave too much room for abuse—especially in today’s political climate.  This 
is what undermined the Report’s effectiveness and furthered the narrative of 
an illegitimate, systemic and partisan-driven “witch hunt” against the Presi-
dent.  
I recommend submitting the Special Counsel Regulations for notice 
and comment review under APA Section 553 to solicit feedback from ex-
perts and the public as to how the Special Counsel Regulations can be im-
proved consistent with the President’s powers under Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution.  At a minimum, I would expect that the received public com-
ment will recommend future Attorneys General be disallowed from disclos-
ing synopses or summaries of Special Counsel reports without simultane-
ously disclosing the entire redacted document.  If this requirement had been 
in place at the time when the Report was submitted to former Attorney Gen-
eral Barr, President Trump would either have been removed from office, or, 
chastened by near conviction in the Senate after impeachment in the House; 
the country would not be facing the current dystopia whereby Trump, who 
was impeached and tried twice, who sought to undermine the rule of law, 
who abused his powers of office to blackmail a friendly foreign government 
and who even attempt to illegally remain in power by undermining the peace-
ful transition of power, remains, by far, the most popular Republican politi-
cian in the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
